Cypherock
  • Introduction
  • Design Decisions
    • The balance between security and convenience
    • Cypherock X1 Hardware architecture
      • Using ultrasonic welding for the X1 Vault enclosure
      • Encrypted NFC communication for X1 cards
      • Using Javacards instead of MicroSD
      • Choosing USB vs QR Code
      • Why the X1 cards are not upgradeable
    • Cypherock is BIP39 compliant
    • Private keys should be near to impossible to extract
    • Conflict between trusted parties should not result in unauthorized access
    • Using Shamir Secret Sharing vs. Multi-sig
      • How is Shamir Secret Sharing implemented within Cypherock X1
      • Why Cypherock has a default 2/5 threshold scheme
      • Rejected Key Schemes
    • PIN Protection on Cypherock X1
      • Difference between backing up your PIN vs. Seed Phrase
  • Security Overview
    • Introduction
    • Keylabs - Third Party Security Audit
    • Remote Attacks
    • Physical Attacks
      • $5 Wrench Attack
      • PIN Brute Force Attack
      • Evil Maid Attack
      • Flashing Malicious Firmware
      • Side Channel Attack
      • Supply Chain Attack
  • Cypherock X1 Features
    • Eliminate messy paper backups
    • Open source with secure elements
    • Use Cypherock as a seed phrase vault
    • All-in-one Portfolio Manager
  • Getting Started
    • Download cySync
    • Import Seed Phrase from existing BIP39 compatible wallet
    • Generate a new wallet with Cypherock X1
    • How Cypherock generates your 24-word seed phrase
    • Best practices in keeping your X1 cards secure
      • Use the protective card sleeves
      • Geographical Seperation
      • Choosing your guardians
    • How do I know I am not locked-in to using only Cypherock X1
    • How do I know my Cypherock X1 is genuine?
      • Email 2FA for Product Authentication
    • How to recover your Crypto assets in the case of loss or theft
    • What happens to my Cypherock X1 if Cypherock goes out of business?
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  1. Design Decisions

Private keys should be near to impossible to extract

Cypherock X1 consists of a decoupled architecture. Unlike other wallets, the computation happens on the X1 Vault and the storage as 5 cryptographic parts between the X1 Vault and 4 X1 Cards. The X1 Vault does not store any private keys/seed phrases as a whole permanently. It only stores the wallet names created by the user and an encrypted cryptographic part (without MAC and nonce) of each wallet in its flash memory.

Once a wallet is created (new wallet is generated from X1 or restored from an existing seed phrase) on the X1 Vault, the ENT as mentioned above is sharded, and the shards generated are sent to the X1 Cards. On the reconstruction step from the X1 Cards, the private key generated back from the threshold shards is only stored in the RAM of the X1 Vault till the time the transaction is signed or the user notes down the seed phrase. If the X1 Vault is powered off at this stage, there is no persistence of the private keys since the RAM is a volatile memory. In a static state, the X1 Vault never holds any sensitive information about the whole private keys making it worthless to attack. In the complete lifecycle of the product, never once is the private key stored as a whole in the flash memory of the generic microcontroller which makes extracting the private keys near impossible. Hence Cypherock X1 is resistant to physical attacks which are prevalent in other hardware and software wallets.

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Last updated 2 years ago

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