Cypherock
  • Introduction
  • Design Decisions
    • The balance between security and convenience
    • Cypherock X1 Hardware architecture
      • Using ultrasonic welding for the X1 Vault enclosure
      • Encrypted NFC communication for X1 cards
      • Using Javacards instead of MicroSD
      • Choosing USB vs QR Code
      • Why the X1 cards are not upgradeable
    • Cypherock is BIP39 compliant
    • Private keys should be near to impossible to extract
    • Conflict between trusted parties should not result in unauthorized access
    • Using Shamir Secret Sharing vs. Multi-sig
      • How is Shamir Secret Sharing implemented within Cypherock X1
      • Why Cypherock has a default 2/5 threshold scheme
      • Rejected Key Schemes
    • PIN Protection on Cypherock X1
      • Difference between backing up your PIN vs. Seed Phrase
  • Security Overview
    • Introduction
    • Keylabs - Third Party Security Audit
    • Remote Attacks
    • Physical Attacks
      • $5 Wrench Attack
      • PIN Brute Force Attack
      • Evil Maid Attack
      • Flashing Malicious Firmware
      • Side Channel Attack
      • Supply Chain Attack
  • Cypherock X1 Features
    • Eliminate messy paper backups
    • Open source with secure elements
    • Use Cypherock as a seed phrase vault
    • All-in-one Portfolio Manager
  • Getting Started
    • Download cySync
    • Import Seed Phrase from existing BIP39 compatible wallet
    • Generate a new wallet with Cypherock X1
    • How Cypherock generates your 24-word seed phrase
    • Best practices in keeping your X1 cards secure
      • Use the protective card sleeves
      • Geographical Seperation
      • Choosing your guardians
    • How do I know I am not locked-in to using only Cypherock X1
    • How do I know my Cypherock X1 is genuine?
      • Email 2FA for Product Authentication
    • How to recover your Crypto assets in the case of loss or theft
    • What happens to my Cypherock X1 if Cypherock goes out of business?
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  1. Security Overview

Remote Attacks

PreviousKeylabs - Third Party Security AuditNextPhysical Attacks

Last updated 1 year ago

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Remote attacks include types of attacks that do not require the physical possession of Cypherock X1. A remote attacker can manipulate data sent to the hardware wallet or control a device that the wallet communicates with. For example, if the wallet connects to a computer over USB, the attacker needs to find and exploit a bug in the device’s USB software stack or application layer usage.

Remote attacks are most relevant to hardware wallets from the perspective of downloading malicious software that would lead to the loss of funds either through user-driven inputs of giving away the seed phrase or making a malicious transaction. There have been growing concerns these days whether there is a probability that the hardware wallet company pushes a malicious firmware update to the hardware to extract the private keys outs of the wallet without user's permission.

In the case of Cypherock X1, there are multiple built-in protections against malicious software interacting with the wallet -

  1. Authenticity Check: Cypherock X1 has secure provisioning that helps ensure that the firmware, as well as the hardware of the X1 Vault, has not been tampered with. When the user initializes the product, both the X1 Vault and the X1 cards are authenticated through the Cypherock server to detect supply chain attacks on the product before the user uses it. Additionally, Cypherock has an that helps users identify whether their cySync app is genuine or not as well.

  2. Seedless by design: Cypherock X1 never exposes the seed phrase of the wallet in plain text during the initialization of the wallet, therefore, any form of phishing attacks are redundant because the user would have to navigate to operations within the wallet and access the existing seed phrase. Additionally, the product warns the user about the implications of viewing the seed phrase and giving it to someone who they might not trust hence protecting against social engineering attacks.

  3. Parts of the private key in non-upgradable hardware: To prevent the scenario where a rogue actor from Cypherock themselves pushes a malicious firmware update, Cypherock X1 is designed such that the private keys are never permanently stored on upgradable hardware. X1 Vault is an upgradable hardware that stores 1 key shard out of the 5 and the 4 X1 Cards once shipped cannot be upgraded even by Cypherock, stores the rest of the 4 key shards each. Additionally, Cypherock is and has its software builds to ensure that the firmware running on the hardware is same as what Cypherock claims in its open source codebase.

email authentication system
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reproduced by Wallet Scrutiny